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Collecting Child Support: A History of 
Federal and State Initiatives 
By Naomi R. Cahn and Jane C. Murphy 
In this article we sketch an overview of 
the increasing federal involvement in the 
child-support area. Because the federal 
role has grown so dramatically over the 
past 25 years, family law practitioners 
need to understand the different federal 
programs and requirements that affect 
state management of child-support pro-
grams. While for many low-income par-
ents state agencies handle child-support 
establishment and collection, the feder-
alization of child support has practical 
implications when it comes to both estab-
lishing and enforcing child support. For 
example, as the time limits of the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act begin to have 
their effects, child support may become 
a supplement more and more needed by 
custodial parents.! 
We begin this article with a brief his-
tory of the changing nature of federal 
involvement in child support-focusing 
on the origins of the federally mandated 
state child-support departments ("IV-D" 
agencies~and then examine the devel-
opment of mandatory child-support guide-
lines. We conclude with a listing of the 
implications of the federalization of child 
support for the family law practitioner. 
I. Background to Federalization 
Although the federal government had 
become involved in child-support pro-
grams much earlier, the Social Services 
Amendments of 1974 Signaled the begin-
ning of the contemporary federal-state 
partnership approach to child support.2 
Through this legislation, Congress man-
dated the creation of the federal Office of 
Child Support Enforcement and required 
that states participate in various programs 
of that office to increase the effectiveness 
of child-support collections. Congress 
adopted the Social Services Amendments 
of 1974 in an effort to remedy a steadily 
increasing number of female-headed 
households living in poverty, which it 
blamed on the rising number of absent 
fathers.3 Senate Finance Committee 
reports cited studies reporting that from 
1959 to 1968, while the poverty rate "for 
male-headed families went down to 7 per-
cent, poverty among female-headed fam-
ilies increased to 32 percent," rising even 
further to 36 percent by 1970.4 
1 See Paula Roberts, The Potential for Child Support as an Income Source for Low-Income 
Families, 31 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 565 (Mar.-Apr. 1998). 
2 Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. 1. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (975) (codified 
at 42 U.S.e. § 1305). 
3 S. REp. No. 93-1356, at 43-44 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.e.C.A.N. 8133, 8146-48. 
4Id. at 8147-48. 
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Before the 1974 amendments, Con-
gress had attempted to deal with child 
abandonment and lax child-support en-
forcement through the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children program.5 In 
1950 Congress established procedures to 
give law enforcement officials notice that 
a child was receiving aid because the 
child had been deserted, abandoned, or 
both, creating for the first time a rela-
tionship between actually receiving assis-
tance and enforcing support obligations.6 
In 1967 Congress enacted legislation man-
dating that each state welfare agency 
"establish a single, identified unit whose 
purpose is to undertake to establish the 
paternity of each child receiving welfare 
... and to secure help for him."7 In spite 
of these steps forward, a 1972 General 
Accounting Office study showed that the 
Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare had failed to monitor state child-
support enforcement practices appropri-
ately and consequently had no knowl-
edge of the degree to which states were 
satisfying federal requirements.8 
Moreover, before the adoption of 
child-support guidelines in the late 1980s, 
judges relied on broad discretionary stan-
dards to decide how much a noncustodi-
al parent must pay in child support.9 
These vague standards were applied in 
any case in which child support was estab-
lished, including in divorce, separation, or 
paternity proceedings in which initial sup-
port was set, or in modification proceed-
ings. Traditionally most states' statutes sim-
ply instructed the court that parents had an 
obligation to support their child.lO Case 
law interpreting these statutory provisions 
required courts, when setting the amount 
of support, to consider the needs of the 
child and the noncustodial spouse's abil-
ity to pay.ll Both the preguideline Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act and the 
Uniform Parentage Act relied on a series 
of factors to determine the appropriate 
amount of child support.12 However, an 
utter lack of uniformity not only between 
states but also within states characterized 
the setting of the level of child support. 
II. Federalization 
Against the background of these failed 
efforts, Congress enacted the Social Ser-
vices Amendments of 1974. Since then, 
the federal government has become in-
creaSingly involved in state child-support 
efforts and now requires child-support 
guidelines, wage withholding, the regis-
tering of new hires, and other methods to 
improve child-support collection. The first 
step toward improving collection was the 
creation of better coordination between 
5 When Aid to Families with Dependent Children was enacted in the 1930s, a father'S 
death was the primary basis for a family'S eligibility. With the advent of social security 
survivor benefits, this baSis of eligibility decreased from 43 percent in 1940 to 4 percent 
in 1973. Id. at 8146. Also, the number of families receiving aid because the father was 
disabled decreased from 18.1 percent in 1961 to 10.2 percent in 1973. Id. Aid benefits to 
families with absent fathers, however, increased from 66.7 percent in 1961 to 80.2 per-
cent in 1973. Id. 
6 Id. at 8148. 
7 Id. at 9148. 
8 Id. at 8148-49. 
9 On child-support guidelines adopted in the late 1980s, see Family Support Act of 1988, 
Pub. 1. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 667 
(1988». See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 301.10 (stating that an approved state plan is a condition 
for federal financial assistance), 302.56(a) (requiring that state plans contain child-sup-
port guidelines) (1990). 
10 . See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501 
(1981); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-203 (1984). 
11 See, e.g., Beck v. Jaeger, 604 P.2d 18, 19 (Ariz. 1979); Pencovic v. Pencovic, 287 P.2d 501 
(Cal. 1955); Unkle v. Unkle, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (Md. App. 1986); Earle v. Earle, 130 
N.y'S.2d 238 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1954); Holt v. Holt, 223 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. App. 1976). See also 
LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION § 1.01, at 1-3 
(Supp. 1997) (describing two factors under preguideline discretionary standard for setting 
child support as "ability of the obligor parent to pay and the needs of the child"). 
12 UNIF. MARRtAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 109, 9A U.L.A. 400 (1987); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §15, 
9B U.L.A. 454 (1973). 
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state and federal collection efforts; the 
second, a requirement of more uniform 
standards for establishing child support. 
A. 1974: Family Support Act, Tide 
IV-D of Social Security Act 
In addition to enacting the Social 
Services Amendments, in 1974, Congress 
enacted the Family Support Act, title IV-
D of the Social Security Act.13 Title IV-D 
required state participation in programs-
including parent location, paternity estab-
lishment, and child-support order enforce-
ment-of the newly established Office of 
Child Support Enforcement.14 The legis-
lation aimed to increase federal oversight 
over state child-support collections, with 
a focus on families on public welfare. Like 
subsequent legislation, it established both 
federal and state obligations. 
1. Federal Obligations 
The Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment was created as a separate unit, with 
the director reporting directly to the 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. IS Under title 
N-D the office was required to (1) estab-
lish standards for state child-support pro-
grams; (2) establish minimum organiza-
tional and staffing requirements for state 
agencies; (3) review and approve state 
programs; (4) evaluate the implementa-
tion of state programs; (5) assist states in 
establishing reporting or records proce-
dures, including technical assistance; (6) 
receive applications from states and grant 
permission to use federal courts to en-
force court orders against out-of-state par-
ents; and (7) operate the "Parent Locator 
Service" as a clearinghouse for data and 
information for locating absent parents 
to enforce their outstanding support 
obligations. I6 Although states retained 
fundamental authority to implement their 
child-support programs, title IV-D dele-
gated to the federal government a more 
active overSight power.17 
2. State Obligations 
Under title IV-D a state plan for child 
support is required to satisfy certain min-
imum standards in order to avoid feder-
al funding sanctions. I8 Pursuant to title 
IV-D a state agency must (1) create a sin-
gle and separate organizational unit (not 
necessarily administered by the welfare 
agency), meeting staffing and organiza-
tional requirements as prescribed by the 
Health and Human Services Secretary; (2) 
undertake to establish the paternity of eli-
gible children; (3) ensure interstate coop-
eration in child-support efforts; (4) spec-
ify ways to distribute proceedings, 
including a plan to make collection ser-
vices available to noneligible children 
through an application process; (5) pro-
vide for cooperative arrangements with 
appropriate courts and law enforcement 
officials to assist in enforcing support 
orders; and (6) set up a parent locator 
service using all sources of information 
and available records in establishing 
paternity, locating an absent parent, and 
securing compliance.19 
As a result of title N-D, recipients of 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
were required to assign their child and 
spousal support rights to the state, a re-
quirement which has continued through-
out all of the changes in welfare law.2o 
Such recipients who also cooperated with 
13 Family Support Act, Pub. 1. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.c. §§ 651-70 (1994)). 
14 See Robyn Shields, Comment, Can the Feds Put Deadbeat Parents in Jail?: A Look At the 
Constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act, 60 ALB. 1. REV. 1409, 1412 (1997). 
15 See Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 452(a), 88 Stat. 2337 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 652 (1994)). 
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 652(a), 653 (as amended). 
17 See S. REp. No. 93-1356, at 46-47 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8150. In 
effect Congress intended to transform the existing federal "perfunctory review" of state 
plans into a more rigorous annual examination of state child-support programs. Id. at 
8151. 
18 See Paula Roberts, Child Support Enforcement: An Introduction, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
868, 869 (Nov. 1991); see also 42 U.S.c. § 654. 
19 42 U.S.C. § 654. 
20 See id. § 656(a)(1); see also Roberts, supra note 18, at 868-69. 
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the state in collection efforts and paterni-
ty establishment were automatically re-
ferred for IV-D services at no additional 
cost. 21 Nonrecipient families might also 
use IV-D services but had to apply for eli-
gibility and pay an application fee. 22 
Under title IV-D states were required 
to pass through some of the money col-
lected to the family.23 Any amount col-
lected beyond the payment to the family 
was retained by the state as reimbursement 
for welfare payments.24 Although states 
As a result of title IV-D, recipients of Aid 
Support Enforcement Amendments to 
strengthen IV-D agencies both jurisdic-
tionally and procedurally and to increase 
the effectiveness of the programs, ensur-
ing their availability to both recipients 
and nonrecipients of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children.27 The amendments 
imposed a number of requirements on 
all IV-D agencies. 28 The amendments 
mandated that the agencies (1) imple-
ment mandatory wage withholding after 
one month of overdue support without 
changing the court order but with ad-
vance notice to ~bsent parents and their 
employers; (2) proVide for liens against 
personal and real property for amounts of 
overdue child support by a resident of 
the state where the property is located; 
(3) withhold income tax refunds to non-
custodial parents who owe overdue pay-
ments; (4) permit paternity establishment 
at any time before a child's 18th birthday 
(extending the statute of limitations on 
support claims); (5) expedite processes 
within a state judicial system for estab-
lishing paternity and enforcing and ob-
taining child-support orders; (6) notify 
recipients of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children at east once each year 
of the amount of child support collected 
on their behalf; and (7) allow broader 
use of the Federal Parent Locator Service 
(states no longer have to exhaust all state 
resources before requesting federal assis-
tance).29 The amendments also reqUired 
states to enact nonbinding gUidelines for 
support awards to be used by judges and 
other administrators.3° 
to Families with Dependent Children were 
required to assign their child and spousal 
support rights to the state, a requirement which 
has continued throughout all of the changes in 
welfare law. 
168 
are no longer required to pass through 
amounts as a result of the 1996 welfare 
reform bill, they are permitted to do so.25 
Title IV-D initiated a nationwide 
growth in child-support enforcement pro-
grams. In 1983 alone $2 billion in pay-
ments, four times the amount in 1976, 
were collected, and 800,000 parents were 
located, an increase over the 181,500 
located in 1976.26 
B. 1984: Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments 
In 1984 Congress enacted the Child 
21 See Roberts, supra note 18, at 869. 
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(B). 
23 See id. § 657. 
24 See id. 
25 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 572-73. 
26 See S. REP. No. 98-387, at 11 (984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2407. 
27 See id at 2397; Roberts, supra note 18, at 871. These amendments "effectively national-
ized" child-support establishment and collection. Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and 
Child Support, 5 VA.]. Soc. POL'y & 1. 541, 546 (998). 
28 See Child Support Enforcement Amendments, Pub. 1. No. 98-378, § 466, 98 Stat. 1306-8 
(1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 666-67). 
29 Id.; see S. REP. No. 98-387, at 29, 30, 53 (984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 
2425-26, 2471. 
30 42 U.S.c. § 667. "The guidelines ... need not be binding upon such judges or other 
officials." Id.; see Shields, supra note 14, at 1412 .. 
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c. 1988: Family Support Act 
Four years later Congress again con-
fronted problems in the enforcement sys-
tem, especially with respect to inconsis-
tent orders.31 The Family Support Act 
made existing provisions more stringent 
and imposed mandatory requirements on 
IV-D agencies in order to continue receiv-
ing federal funding. 32 
The Act also changed the method of 
establishing child-support levels. The 
inadequacy of most states' discretionary 
standards in setting the amount of child 
support took on crisis proportions by the 
early 1980s. Insufficient child support had 
become a major cause of the spiraling 
poverty rate among women and chil-
dren.33 Of the 9.4 million custodial par-
ents in 1987, 41 percent had no child-
support award.34 When courts did award 
child support, award levels usually were 
inadequate, thrusting many children and 
custodial parents into poverty or a seri-
ously diminished standard of living.35 In 
1979 the average awards comprised only 
37 percent of the estimated average 
monthly expenditure for children in a 
middle-income household and only 55 
percent in a low-income household.36 
Over time the poor record of collecting 
child support combined with the inade-
quate level of awards resulted in a sub-
stantialloss of child support for custodi-
al households.37 
In addition to the inadequacy of the 
award itself, the traditional system of vir-
tually unlimited judicial discretion in this 
area led to "pronounced disparities in 
awards from court to court, from judge to 
judge, and from case to case.,,38 Although 
some of the disparity may have been 
attributable to such factors as differences 
in income of noncustodial parents, the 
existence of an alimony award, and the 
type of custody awarded, substantial arbi-
trary differences existed. In one study 
from the mid-1980s a random sampling of 
cases revealed that fathers earning $155 
per week had to pay anywhere from $10 
to $60 per week for one child, depend-
ing on the judge.39 
The Family Support Act made sup-
port award guidelines binding in any 
"judicial or administrative proceeding. ,,40 
Courts were supposed to treat guidelines 
as rebuttable presumptions and disregard 
them only upon a specific showing that 
the guidelines would be unjust and inap-
propriate in a particular case.41 The Act 
further required states to enact laws pro-
31 See S. REP. No. 100-377, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2777, 2778. 
32 See id. at 2778; Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. 1. No. 485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 666--()7. 
33 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987, 
CURRENT POPULATION REpORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 167, at 2-4 (1990) [here-
inafter CENSUS BUREAU]. 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 Lucy Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of 
Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 
DENY. U. 1. REv. 21, 50 (1979). 
36 . Karen Seal, A Decade of No-Fault DIVorce: What It Has Meant Financially to Women in 
California, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1979, at 10, 13-15 (estimating that child-support awards 
are less than half the actual costs of raising a child). 
37 In 1987 only one-half of the women with child-support orders received the full amount. 
Almost one-quarter received partial payments while the other one-quarter received noth-
ing. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 33, at 4. 
38 Sally F. Goldfarb, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Child Support GUidelines, 13 
FAM. 1. REP. 3031, 3032 (1987). 
39 
40 
41 
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 12 (1986); see Yee, supra note 35, at 28, 
52-53. But see MARYGOLD S. MELLI, CHILD SuPPORT AWARDS: A STUDY OF THE EXERCISE OF 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 41-42 (lnst. for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper 73~3, 1983) 
(finding that variations in the approximately 148 child-support orders from the four 
judges studied was more a function of the differences in income of the parties than of 
the differences in criteria applied by the judges). 
42 U.S.c. §§ 666--()67. 
See id. § 667(b)(2). 
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viding for immediate wage withholding, 
regardless of whether the payments were 
in arrears, unless a party could demon-
strate good cause for a statutory de-
viance.42 States were required to develop 
better information processing.43 The Act 
also created performance standards for 
state paternity establishment programs.44 
D. 1992: Child Support Recovery Act 
To remedy inefficient and inconsis-
tent enforcement from state to state, 
Congress enacted the Child Support Re-
covery Act of 1992, which created a new 
federal crime for willful failure to make 
past-due support payments to a child 
residing in another state.45 The elements 
of the interstate crime are willful failure 
to pay child support (1) that is due to a 
child residing in a different state from the 
obligor and (2) that is due in an amount 
greater than $5,000 or has remained 
unpaid longer than one year.46 The par-
ent's first offense results in a fine or 
imprisonment for not more than six 
months or both.47 Any subsequent of-
fenses result in a fine or imprisonment 
for up to two years or both.48 A court 
would order restitution of all past-due 
support in addition to a fine or impris-
onment.49 Moreover, the Act gave feder-
al judges discretion to require full pay-
42 See Id. § 666. 
43 See Id. §§ 503, 667. 
ment of child-support obligations as a 
condition of probation. 50 
E. 1993: Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act 
To reduce the large Medicaid pay-
ments to children denied coverage under 
their noncustodial parent's insurance, 
Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, which amend-
ed the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 to establish Qualified 
Medical Child Support Orders.51 In effect 
Congress mandated that employers with 
employees who were child-support oblig-
ors extend health plan coverage to the 
obligor's children. 52 
F. 1996: Welfare Reform Law 
In 1996 Congress enacted the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act.53 This law 
affects not only public welfare but also 
nearly every aspect of child-support ser-
vices with respect to both obligations of 
IV-D agencies and the duties of the recip-
ients themselves. 
1. Federal Obligations 
The Act expands the Federal Parent 
Locator Service, permitting parties to use 
the service not only to enforce child-sup-
44 See Id. § 666; see a/so Roberts, supra note 18, at 873 (stating that all parties of contested 
actions must submit to genetic testing). 
45 Child Support Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 228(a), 106 Stat. 3403 (1992) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 228). 
46 See Id. § 228(d)(1)(B). For a general discussion of the Child Support Recovery Act, see 
Shields, supra note 14. 
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 228(b). 
48 See td. 
49 See id. § 228(c). 
50 See td. § 3563(b). 
51 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.c. § 1169 (1994); Pub. 1. No. 
103-66, § 4301(a), 107 Stat. 312, 372 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1144, 1169); 
see Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federaltzatton of Enforcement Nears 
Completion, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 702 (Congress was trying to combat the denial of 
coverage to children because of "restrictive dependency definitions and [Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act) preemption"). 
52 See 29 U.S.C. § 1169(a)(2)(B)(i). The legislation required states to enact laws that would 
apply to all health plans, regardless of the number of employees. Elrod, supra note 51, 
at 702. 
53 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. 1. No. 104-193, 
110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.). 
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port orders but also to establish parent-
age, modify child-support orders, and 
enforce custody or visitation orders.54 The 
Act also broadens the information made 
available through the service to include 
records concerning wages, employee 
benefits, and type, status, location, and 
amount of assets.55 
To facilitate locating individuals to 
establish paternity or to modify or enforce 
a support order, the Act mandates that 
all employers must report information on 
new hires within 20 days to a state direc-
tory. The National Directory of New Hires 
is an automated directory of records from 
the state directories. 56 The Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services must compare data col-
lected in the directory with information in 
the Federal Case Registry at least every 
two business days and report any match-
es.57 The registry is an automated record 
system containing support orders and 
case information. 58 
2. State Obligations 
The Act imposes several obligations 
on state agencies in addition to expand-
ing the Federal Parent Locator Service 
and facilitating the establishment of pater-
nity. The Act requires structural and pro-
grammatic changes, promotes the adop-
tion of uniform state laws, and modifies 
requirements for program eligibility and 
disbursement of support payments. 
The Act expands eligibility for ser-
vices and increases state IV-D agency 
obligations to provide a wider range of 
child-support enforcement services. 59 
State agencies must now provide for the 
establishment, modification, and enforce-
ment of support orders to an increased 
range of children, including those receiv-
ing benefits from the Temporary Assist-
ance for Needy Families block grant and 
foster care payments.60 
The Act also mandates significant 
changes in the case tracking and parent 
locator systems in each state. Each state 
must establish an automated state case reg-
istry, containing a record of each case in 
which a state agency is proViding ser-
vices.61 The Act encourages states to com-
pile these registries by "linking local case 
records through an automated information 
network" and using "standardized data ele-
ments" to make available names, dates of 
birth, and identification numbers.62 The 
state agency is also responsible for updat-
ing and monitoring the records.63 
The Act further requires that state 
agencies enact specific procedures to 
expedite the establishment of paternity 
and enforcement of support orders, alle-
viating the need for additional judicial or 
administrative proceedings to obtain per-
mission for modification.64 State agencies 
must have the authority to (1) order 
genetic testing; (2) subpoena financial 
information to enforce a support order; 
(3) require all state entities to give infor-
mation about employment, compensa-
tion, and benefits of any individual 
employed by that entity; (4) access state 
records including corrections records and 
vital statistics, tax, and revenue informa-
54 See § 316(c)a, 110 Stat. at 2214-15 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 653). For general infor-
mation about the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Opportunity Act, see 
Paula Roberts, The Family Law Implications of the 1996 Welfare Legtslatton, 30 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 988 (Jan.-Feb. 1997). 
55 See § 316(c)a, 110 Stat. at 2214-15 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 653). 
56 See § 453A(g)(2), 110 Stat. at 2211 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 653(0). 
57 See § 316(j)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 2217 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 653(j». 
58 See § 316(h)(1), 110 Stat. at 2216. 
59 See § 301, 110 Stat. at 2199 (to be codified at 42 U.S.c. § 654). 
60 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 33 (1996), reprinted tn 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2726. 
61 See § 311(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 2205 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 454A(e». 
62 See id. 
63 See td. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 454A(e)(5». 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(c); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, (1996), reprtnted tn 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2741. 
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tion; (5) order income withholding or 
secure assets; (6) increase the amount of 
support payments to include arrearages; 
and (7) authorize statewide jurisdiction 
over child-support and paternity cases.65 
To facilitate paternity establishment, 
the Act requires states to permit paterni-
ty establishment at any time before a child 
is 18 years of age and to mandate genet-
ic testing in a contested paternity case at 
the request of one party.66 States must 
create a simple civil process for voluntary 
paternity acknowledgment, including pro-
cedures enacting a hospital-based pro-
gram, and also safeguard the due process 
rights of the mother and putative father 
with respect to awareness of the legal 
consequences of and the alternatives to 
voluntary paternity acknowledgment. 67 
Another notable aspect of the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act is its effort 
to promote the adoption of uniform state 
laws.68 For instance, it required that all 
states adopt the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act by January 1, 1998.69 More-
over, in amending the Full Faith and 
Credit Act, the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
clarifies choice of law and jurisdictional 
dilemmas which may arise.7o First, if only 
one court issues a support order, that 
order must be recognized.71 But if two 
or more courts issue orders, and only one 
court maintains exclusive jurisdiction, the 
order of the exclusive-jurisdiction court 
65 42 v.s.c. § 666(c). 
66 ld. § 666(a)(S). 
should take precedence.72 If two or more 
courts issue orders and more than one 
claims exclusive jurisdiction, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act gives precedence to 
the court located in the child's current 
state of residence.73 If the courts of the 
child's resident state do not issue any 
orders, the parties adhere to the order 
most recently issued from any court.74 
States must respond within five business 
days to one another's requests to enforce 
orders.75 
State IV-D agencies are also required 
by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act to oper-
ate a centralized system to collect and 
distribute child-support payments for 
orders issued after December 31, 1993.76 
The agency must use automated proce-
dures to (1) receive payments for dis-
bursement to custodial parents; (2) iden-
tify payments accurately; (3) ensure 
prompt disbursement; and (4) furnish 
timely information about the current sta-
tus of support payments upon request.77 
The Act prescribes that the state distrib-
ute support payments to families within 
two business days of their receipt.78 At a 
minimum, IV-D agencies must utilize dis-
bursement units to transmit orders to 
employers for income Withholding, mon-
itor and identify any failures to make 
timely payments, and automatically use 
enforcement procedures if the timely pay-
ments are not made.79 
67 See td. The father's name is included on the birth certificate of a child of unmarried par-
ents only if both the mother and father sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or 
a court or agency issues a paternity adjudication. ld. § 666(a)(S)(D). 
68 See § 321, 110 Stat. at 2221 (amending 42 v.s.c. § 666(0). 
69 See id. 
70 See § 322, 110 Stat. at 2221 (amending 42 V.S.C. § 1738B(0). 
71 See 42 U.s.c. § 1738B(O(1). 
72 See td. § 1738B(O(2). 
73 See id. § 1738B(O(3). 
74 See id. 
75 See id. § 666(a)(14). 
76 See id. § 6S4b(a). 
77 See td. § 6S4b(a)(3)(b). 
78 See td. § 6S4b(a)(3)(c). 
79 See td. § 6S4b(a). 
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The Act modifies distribution of 
child-support collections to welfare recip-
ients so that the first $50 received no 
longer goes straight to a family.80 Col-
lections on arrearages which accumulate 
after the family leaves the welfare system 
are paid to the state if collected through 
"tax intercept.,,81 Also, any arrearages 
accumulated before the family went on 
welfare are paid to the state if they are 
procured through tax seizure; otherwise, 
those funds go to the family.82 Using 
these new procedures, Congress intend-
ed to "provide more money to families 
that leave welfare and thereby increase 
the odds that such families will be able to 
maintain their independence from public 
benefits. ,,83 
III. Implications for Practitioners 
The major effects of the "federalization" 
of child support for practitioners concern 
the shift from discretionary child-support 
standards to the use of guidelines to 
establish and modify the amount of sup-
port, the development of mandatory 
wage Withholding, and the strengthening 
of interstate enforcement. 
A. From Discretionary Standards to 
Guidelines 
The preguideline statutory and case 
law on how to set child support has lit-
tle relevance in disputes regarding the 
appropriate amount of child support 
today. The Family Support Act did, how-
ever, preserve limited judicial discretion. 
Decision makers hearing child-support 
cases can rebut the presumption that the 
gUideline level of support is appropriate 
by a specific finding that application of 
the gUidelines would be unjust or inap-
propriate in a particular case, as deter-
mined under criteria established by each 
state.84 Cases from the discretionary era 
therefore may be of some value in rebut-
ting the presumption in favor of the 
guidelines in particular circumstances. 
For example, the application of guide-
lines under many "income shares" for-
mulae results in a higher percentage of 
income devoted to child support for low-
income obligors than for middle- and 
high-income obligors.8S The percentage 
of income presumed to go toward child 
support under many of these formulae 
goes down as the income of the obligor 
increases. Both judges and commenta-
tors have expressed concern that such 
formulae combined with stricter enforce-
ment of child support may have harmful 
effects on low-income obligors and drive 
80 See id. § 657; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-651, at 1398-99 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2457-58. 
81 See 42 U.S.c. § 657; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 339 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2727. 
82 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 340 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2728. 
83 H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1399 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2458. 
84 42 U.S.c. § 667(b)(2). 
85 For a complete list of states that have adopted the "income shares" model, see Laura W. 
Morgan & Mark C. Lino, A Comparison of Child Support Awards Calculated Under States' 
Child Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 191 (1999). 
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them "underground.,,86 Attorneys repre-
senting low-income obligors then might 
persuade the tribunal to deviate from the 
guidelines and order less than the pre-
sumed amount by relying on arguments 
from preguideline case law emphasizing 
that child support should not be ordered 
at a level which makes it difficult for the 
obligor to support himself.87 
Some courts, particularly where the 
parents are unmarried and the obligor 
and child have not lived together, seem 
to set a maximum amount of child sup-
port regardless of parental income.88 In 
others, where the parents and child or 
children have lived together as a family, 
courts have held that support should be 
awarded at a level which permits the chil-
dren to maintain the predivorce standard 
of living.89 Apart from these limited cir-
cumstances, practitioners should consid-
er the pre gUideline body of case law 
inapplicable in cases in which issues arise 
as to the amount of support. 
B. Mandatory Wage Withholding 
Income or wage garnishment has long 
been available to the practitioner as a 
method of collecting unpaid child sup-
port.90 Before 1984, use of this enforce-
ment remedy was governed almost exclu-
sively by state law. Early wage withholding 
statutes simply reqUired employers to 
honor voluntary wage assignments. 
In 1974 only 10 states had statutory 
versions of child-support wage assign-
ments.91 By 1984 26 states began sys-
tematic withholding-based on a court 
order after the finding of a delinquen-
cy-of income from an obligor's pay-
check.92 These state statutes and cases 
ranged widely on issues such as pregar-
nishment procedural protections for the 
obligor, triggers for income withholding, 
and limits on the percentage of an oblig-
or's wages which could be withheld.93 
Limits on withholding were made some-
what uniform by the passage of the fed-
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act in 
86 See JOHN F. FADER II & RICHARD J. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAw § 13.91 (1992 Cumul. 
Supp.) (two judges who authored treatise express "concern" that Maryland "income 
shares" formulae will result in orders in which low- to moderate-income payors will not 
be able to support themselves and meet their child-support obligation); see also Harry D. 
Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in 
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166 (Stephen Sugarman & Herman Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
87 See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Money Awarded as 
Child Support, 27 A.L.R.4th 873, 887--89 (1984). 
88 See White v. Marciano, 235 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1987) (finding that $1,500 per month was a 
reasonable amount of support for child born outside of marriage to father with income 
of $1 million per year and that father'S lavish lifestyle was relevant only if father was 
unable to make "adequate support payments"); Evans v. Evans, 559 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 
1997) (Clearinghouse No. 48,074) (where the parties' income exceeds the statutory 
gUidelines, the child-support obligation shall be established at an appropriate level, tak-
ing into account the actual needs and standard of living of the child). 
89 See In re Scafuri, 561 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1990) (where children's needs and accustomed 
lifestyle could be maintained on an award of $6,000 per month, trial court's order of 
$10,000 per month was an abuse of discretion even though it complied with the guide-
lines). 
90 HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 345-49 (1981). Some 
states allowed the assignment of the father's wages when the support decree was 
entered. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4701(a) (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.12(2) 
(West Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.265 (West Supp. 1983). Others required default 
in the payment of support before allowing an aSSignment of the obligor's wages. See, 
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2455 (West 1982); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 552.605 (West 
Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.611 (West Supp. 1984). 
91 Note, Remedies-Domestic Relations: Garnishment for Child Support, 56 N.C. L. REV. 169, 
177-78 n.57 (1978). 
92 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATES' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1984 CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT AMENDMENT 9 (Dec. 1985). 
93 On pregarnishment procedural protections for the obligor, see Lany V. Superior Court, 200 
Cal. Rptr. 526 (1984) (pregamishment hearing required); Hehr V. Tucker, 472 P.2d 797 (Or. 
1970) (no pregarnishment hearing required). Most states used a delinquent dollar amount 
as a trigger for income Withholding, but some used a time delay in paying support. 
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1968.94 That Act placed a maximum limit 
on the amount states might withhold for 
child support but did not set a minimum. 
Limits on percentage of income which 
may be withheld still vary. 
The effectiveness of withholding 
under state law was limited for a number 
of reasons. As with decisions governing 
the amount of child support, the decision 
to order wage withholding was within 
the court's discretion.95 Proceedings for 
wage Withholding were judicial rather 
than administrative and, for lack of fixed 
rules, were often adversarial. Most states 
permitted wage garnishment only after 
child-support arrearages had accrued. 
Custodial parents had to return to court 
to obtain a new withholding order each 
time arrears accumulated. Thus practi-
tioners would counsel clients with child-
support orders to wait until substantial 
back child support had accumulated be-
fore incurring the expense of obtaining a 
wage garnishment order. 
Federal legislation has improved the 
effectiveness of this remedy. While state 
wage withholding statutes still vary, a 
series of federal statutes mandates fea-
tures which all states must adopt. To-
gether these features have created a leg-
islative scheme which is designed to 
make wage withholding a regular item 
of every child-support order from the 
date of issuance until the termination of 
the order. 
Pursuant to the Child Support En-
forcement Amendments, all states were 
required to enact procedures for wage 
withholding to collect child support in all 
cases where the obligor had fallen into 
arrears.96 "Wage" withholding became 
"income" withholding under this statute 
because the amendments authorized 
states to expand the definition of "wages" 
to include forms of income other than 
those normally included in the defini-
tion.97 Pennsylvania, for example, defines 
"income" as compensation for services, 
including but not limited to wages, 
salaries, fees, compensation in kind, com-
missions and similar items, income 
derived from bUSiness, gains derived from 
dealings in property, forms of retirement, 
pensions, income from discharge of 
indebtedness, distributive share of part-
nership gross income, income with re-
spect to a decedent, income from an 
interest in an estate or trust, military retire-
ment benefits, railroad employment 
retirement benefits, social security bene-
fits, temporary and permanent disability 
benefits, workmen's compensation, and 
94 Initially the Consumer Credit Protection Act allowed wage garnishments of up to 25 per-
cent of a wage-earner's disposable income or 30 times the federal minimum hourly 
wage, whichever was the lesser amount. 15 U.S.c. § 1673(a). In 1977 Congress amended 
the Act to raise Withholding ceilings of child support or alimony orders to (1) 50 percent 
of the employee's weekly disposable earnings if obligor supports a second family; (2) 55 
percent if obligor supports a second family and arrears are 12 weeks past due; (3) 60 
percent if he or she does not support a second family; or (4) 65 percent if the employee 
does not support a second family and the action is to enforce a support order for a peri-
od commencing more than 12 weeks before the workweek from which the wages will 
be garnished (i.e., arrears are 12 weeks past due). The Act preempts less restrictive state 
laws, so limitations apply even if a state does not incorporate the Act's limitations into 
its withholding statute. 15 U.S.c. 1677; Marshall v. District Court, 444 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981). States are, however, free to enact statutes that proVide greater protection of 
obligors' income. 15 U.S.c. § 1677. 
95 See, e.g., Nan Hunter, Child Support Law and PoliCy: The Systemic Imposition of Costs on 
Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S 1.]. 1 (1983). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 659. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 made a distinc-
tion between private cases and allowed states to develop procedures for Withholding 
when a private order was involved. Later statutes have eliminated the different treatment 
for IV-D and non-IV-D orders. 
97 42 U.S.c. § 666(b)(8). Most states define income more broadly under the Child Support 
Enforcement Amendments for Withholding purposes than the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act's definition of "disposable earnings" subject to Withholding. In child-sup-
port withholding cases, the state's definition of income subject to Withholding governs 
as long as it is broader than the Consumer Credit Protection Act's definition. 
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unemployment compensation.98 Other 
state statutes have been interpreted to 
include as income "commissions" due or 
advanced to the obligor, disabled veter-
an's benefits, lottery winnings, and mili-
tary retirement pay.99 Under the amend-
ments, wages could be withheld to cover 
current support as well as arrears up to 
the limits set by the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act. 100 The amendments' sec-
tion that restricts the amount of wages a 
tions for terminating withholding before 
the enforcement agency notifies the 
employer to stop. Such notification would 
presumably follow an application by the 
obligor and a court order. 
~ile state wage withholding statutes still vary, 
a series of federal statutes mandates features 
which all states must adopt. 
For practitioners, January 1, 1994, 
marked the major change in availability 
of immediate wage Withholding. As of 
that date, all new child-support orders, 
including non-IV-D cases, had to provide 
for immediate income Withholding. Wage 
Withholding was not to be ordered if 
good cause was shown by the obligor to 
exclude such a provision or both parties 
agreed to an alternative arrangement. 106 
This is an important provision for practi-
tioners representing clients who do not 
want to be subject to automatic with-
holding and can obtain the agreement of 
the custodial parent to waive this pro-
tection. A good-cause exception or agree-
ment may be set aside, however, and 
withholding imposed if an obligor is 
delinquent in support in an amount equal 
to one month's support. 
176 
state may withhold to no more than the 
limits of the consumer credit act does not 
apply to nonwage income. lOl 
The amendments also required that 
states have a procedure for terminating 
arrearages.102 States were free to establish 
their own procedures but were not 
allowed to make payment of arrears the 
sole criteria for termination of wage with-
holding. l03 As a result, some states have 
discretionary standards for termination of 
Withholding, permitting the obligor to 
argue that such termination would be 
equitable. 104 Others have more specific 
criteria, including inability to deliver pay-
ments to obligee and emancipation of 
children. lOS Employers may face sanc-
As part of its scheme for reforming 
the welfare system, the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act also includes a number of pro-
visions designed to strengthen child-
support enforcement. Since eligibility for 
withholding was made more or less uni-
versal by the Family Support Act, the 
income withholding provisions in the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act focus primarily 
98 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4302 (West Supp. 1989); see Stinner v. Stinner, 554 A.2d 45 
(Pa.), cert. dented, 492 U.S. 919 (1989). 
99 See Galpen v. Galpen, 535 A.2d 35 (N.]. Super. Ct. 1987) (commissions); Rose v. Rose, 
481 U.S. 619 (1987) (disabled veteran's benefits); County of Contra Costa v. Lemon, 252 
Cal. Rptr. 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (lottery winnings); Millard v. U.S., 16 Cl. Ct. 485 
(1989), a/f'd, 916 F.2d 1 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 916 (991) (military retirement 
pay). But see County of Kern, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1999) (lottery winnings). 
100 See discussion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 94. 
101 If a state does define wages to include all income, then the Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments require that the Consumer Credit Protection Act apply to all income; but if 
a state does not combine wage and nonwage income in its definition of wages, then 
nonwage income is not subject to the amendments' mandatory use of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act's caps. 42 U.S.c. § 666(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987). 
102 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(9) (999). 
103 Id. 
104 See Simpson v. Simpson, 680 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
105 See In re Feiock, 215 Cal. App. 3d 141 (1989) (inability to deliver payments to obligee); 
Denton v. Sims, 884 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (emancipation of children). 
106 42 U.S.c. § 466 (a)(8)(B)(i). 
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW I JULY-AUGUST 2000 
on the procedures implementing auto-
matic withholding. 107 The latter encour-
ages but does not require states to adopt 
administrative rather than judicial systems 
to enforce child support. States, howev-
er, must have certain "expedited proce-
dures" for handling routine cases, includ-
ing cases in which income withholding is 
ordered. These expedited procedures 
grant authority to the state IV-D agency 
to initiate withholding or to modify any 
order that does not have income with-
holding "without the necessity of obtain-
ing an order from any judicial or admin-
istrative tribunal."I08 Record keeping of 
amounts collected and disbursed through 
withholding is to be centralized in a sin-
gle state office rather than several local 
offices. I09 The central state office must 
have sufficient staff to monitor and 
enforce support obligations through the 
centralized unit. IIO The central office is 
also supposed to make timely responses 
to requests from parents (or, presumably, 
their attorneys) about the status of their 
cases. Again, for those attorneys repre-
senting clients-both obligors and oblig-
ees-who want to opt out of the auto-
matic withholding system, the exceptions 
for good cause and consent waiver of 
withholding are preserved in the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act. 11 I For those attorneys 
whose clients opt for automatic with-
holding, these changes mean more re-
liance on and interaction with their state's 
IV-D or child-support agency. 
C. New Enforcement Remedies 
Another major effect of the federal-
ization of child support is the strength-
ening of interstate enforcement of child-
support orders in two major ways: 
through license revocation and interstate 
orders. 
1. License Revocation 
During the 1990s many states enact-
ed legislation authorizing licensing agen-
cies to withhold, suspend, or restrict the 
use of driver's, occupational, recreation-
al, or sporting licenses or all four as a 
means to collect child support. The 
Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act requires states 
to have and use such statutes as a sanc-
tion for failing to pay child support or, 
after receiving appropriate notice, to com-
ply with subpoenas or warrants relating to 
paternity or child-supportproceedings.112 
By 1998 all 50 states had enacted 
license-revocation statutes. The legisla-
tive schemes for license restriction vary 
conSiderably from state to state. 113 Al-
though the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
requires that states cover driver's, occu-
pational, and recreational licenses, not all 
107 Pub. 1. No. 104-193, § 314, 110 Stat. 2105, 2212-14 (996) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.c. § 666). 
108 Id. § 325. 
109 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act allows states to 
opt for a decentralized computer-linked system if the system "will not cost more nor 
take more time to establish and operate than a centralized system." Id. § 312, 110 Stat. at 
2207-8 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 654b). If states opt for a decentralized sys-
tem, they must still set up a Single place for employers to send collected support. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. § 325. 
113 Por an excellent comparison of the features of most state license revocation statutes, see 
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE LICENSE 
RESTRICTIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND REVOCATIONS (Jan. 1998). The Office of Child Support 
Enforcement prepares "information exchanges" on a regular basis on a variety of child-
support topics. These exchanges provide state-by-state information identifying names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of contact people in IV-D agencies to assist in imple-
menting statutes to initiate or enforce child support. Practitioners can obtain such publi-
cations by calling or writing OCSE/Technical Assistance Branch, 4th Ploor E., 370 
L'Enfant Promenade SW, Washington, DC 20447; 202.401.9267. Information can also be 
obtained through the Web site www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs!cse. 
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states are in compliance. Some states amount of the arrearage-ranging from 
cover only driver's licenses.114 Others are minimal amounts up to a maximum re-
limited to occupational licenses.115 Still quirement of $2,500.1 21 Still others have 
others go beyond the sanctions mandat- criteria that trigger the license sanction 
ed by the Act and permit restricting state based upon either the amount or the 
benefits such as student grants, govern- length of arrearages. 122 Some statutes 
ment contracts, car and other vehicle reg- make license revocation available only if 
istration, and weapon permits.116 other enforcement remedies have been 
States have adopted criteria for re- exhausted or if income withholding is 
voking licenses for failure to pay child unavailable. 123 
support. Some states require a minimum The procedural protections afforded 
period of child-support delinquency be- delinquent obligors also differ from state 
fore a license may be revoked, ranging to state in terms of both prerevocation 
from one month to one year. 117 Other protections and postrevocation review. 
statutes require different periods of arrear- All state statutes require some form of 
age depending upon the type of license prerevocation notice and hearing. A typ-
being withheld, suspended, or re- ical statute provides for notice through 
voked. 11B The most common arrearage certified mail informing obligors that they 
periods which trigger the license sanc- are subject to revocation, the basis for 
tions range from 60 to 90 days.119 the revocation, and the steps that can be 
Some states require a court order of taken to avoid suspension or loss of a 
contempt before an obligor may be sub- license.124 Some statutes governing pre-
ject to license revocation. 120 Other states revocation review limit the basis for such 
limit license revocations based upon the review to mistakes of fact, while others 
114 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.3837 
(Michie 1996). 
115 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-146, 74-147, 20-1204a (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2301.373, 2301.374 (West 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4355 (West 1998). 
116 See FLA. STAT. chs. 409.2598, 327.031 (vessel registration), 322.058 (vehicle registration) 
(1999); IDAHO CODE § 7-1401 2151(c) (1997) (weapon permits); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 518.551 (West 1999) (student grants); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 795 (998) (government 
contracts). 
117 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350.6(a)(4) (West 1999) (one month); Ky. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (one year). 
118 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 795 (contracts, licenses: one-twelfth of annual support in 
arrears), 798 (motor vehicle: one-fourth of annual support in arrears) (998). 
119 Statutes requiring 60 days' arrearage include the follOWing: COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-13-123 
(1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-5251 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-541 (999); MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAw § 10-119 (998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-B (1998); S.c. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-7-940 (Law. Co-op. 1998); TJTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-11-107, 78-32-17 (998). Statutes 
requiring 90 days' arrearage include the following: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-220 (997); 5 
GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 34202-03 (999); IOWA CODE § 252].2 (1997); MINN. STAT. § 518.551 
(999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-3314 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ IT-142.2 (driver's licenses), 
142.1 (professional and business licenses) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08.1-06 (998); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-201.1, tit. 43, § 139.1 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-11.1-
2, -7 (1998); TIDe FAM. CODE ANN. § 232.003 (West Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 220-6-
111 (Michie 1999). 
120 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-502 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-147 (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 93-11-157 (998). 
121 See OR. REV. STAT. § 25.7500)(a) (1999) ($2,500); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 8, § 528a (995) 
(minimal amount). 
122 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-13-123, -126, 42-2-127.5 (997); Mo. REV. STAT. § 454.1000-
1025 (1997). 
123 See FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13016 (998) (if other remedies have been exhausted); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2301.373, 3113.216 (Anderson 1998) (if other remedies have been exhaust-
ed); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4355 (West 1998) (if income withholding is unavailable). 
124See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-56.41 
(West 1998). 
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allow obligors to defend, based upon an 
inability to pay, against such sanctions.125 
Postrevocation review is available in most 
states through an administrative proce-
dure, judicial hearings, or some combi-
nation of the two.126 
Because of the variation in state law, 
practitioners should consult their state 
statutes both for procedures and criteria 
for invoking license revocations and for 
defenses and hearing opportunities avail-
able to obligors. Most states' child-support 
statutes have a general provision relating 
to license limitations to enforce child-sup-
port orders. Because driver's, occupation-
al, and other licenses are regulated under 
different statutes and regulations, each 
with its own set of licensing provisions, 
practitioners should also consult each state 
law governing the activity covered by the 
license. These license-revocation statutes 
are especially useful for practitioners seek-
ing to enforce child-support orders in 
which obligors are nonwage earners, par-
ticularly self-employed professionals. On 
the other hand, practitioners seeking to 
protect obligors against such revocations 
should be aware of constitutional and 
other potential challenges to such statutes. 
Equal protection arguments have 
been used to challenge driver's license 
revocation statutes. The theory behind 
these arguments is that such statutes cre-
ate a legislative classification between 
child-support obligors who have driver's 
licenses and those who do not, thus sub-
jecting obligor drivers to harsher penal-
ties when they fail to pay child support. 
Because such a classification need only 
meet the rational relationship test and the 
Supreme Court has found child-support 
enforcement an important state interest, 
such challenges have not been success-
ful. 127 Professional license revocation 
programs are also likely to withstand 
equal protection challenges under the 
same analysis. 128 
License-revocation statutes that apply 
to all licensed occupations except attor-
neys have also been challenged in the 
courts. Attorneys were excluded from 
these statutes because regulation of attor-
neys, unlike other professionals, in many 
states is within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the state's highest court rather than the 
legislature. Some courts have responded to 
challenges that excluding attorneys ren-
ders the statute arbitrary by amending the 
court's disciplinary rules to include license-
revocation provisions for attorneys.129 
The most promising challenges to 
such state statutes may be due process 
125 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4355 (West 1998) (review for mistakes of fact); P.R. LAws 
ANN. tit. 8, § 528a (1995) (review for mistakes of fact); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 798 (1998) 
(inability to pay may be a defense). 
126 See ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.246 (Michie 1998) (combination); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-518 
(West 1998) (judicial hearing); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 16-203 (1995) (administrative 
procedure); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.551 (West 1999) (combination); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 93-11-157 (1998) (combination); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 139.1 (West 1998) (judicial 
hearing). 
127 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Clearinghouse No. 15,279) (child-support 
enforcement found to be important state interest). Some unsuccessful challenges include 
the following: Rushmore v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1992) 
(applying the "rational basis" standard and emphasizing that a suspension statute having 
a disproportionate impact on drug offenders who operate motor vehicles does not 
offend equal protection); State v. Smith, 276 A.2d 369 (N.]. 1971) (stating that the equal 
protection clause does not require that the legislature punish all violators of narcotics 
laws in the same way or not at all and that the legislature has wide discretion in recog-
nizing different classes of offenders for separate treatment). See generally Jeffrey T. 
Walter, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute or Regulation Authorizing 
Revocation or Suspension of Driver's License for Reason unrelated to Use oj, or Ability to 
Operate, a Motor Vehicle, 18 A.1.R.5th 542 (1994). 
128 Mark R. Fondacaro & Dennis P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle and Professional Licenses 
for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement: Constitutional Challenges and Policy 
Implications, 5 CORNELL].1. & PUB. POL'y 355, 389 (1996). 
129 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 4-8.4 (West 1994); see also Rhonda M. Hand & R. Wade 
Wetherington, Chasing the Deadbeat Professional for Child Support, 69 FLA. B.]. 54 (Nov. 
1995); IND. ADMISSION & DISCIPLINE R. 23, §§ l1(c), 18(c). 
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challenges based upon the availability or 
scope or both availability and scope of 
administrative and judicial review in the 
state statute. While the argument may be 
made that an obligor is entitled to a judi-
cial determination before revocation, a 
predeprivation administrative hearing that 
allows the obligor a "meaningful" oppor-
tunity to be heard should be sufficient.130 
A constitutional challenge may be suc-
cessful, however, if the statute does not 
permit judicial (as opposed to adminis-
trative) review at the postrevocation 
stage.131 Moreover, at least one court has 
held that the scope of the judicial review 
must permit the obligor the opportunity 
to seek relief based on his inability to pay 
the child support owed.132 
2. Interstate Orders 
Finding a growing number of cases 
involving disputes between parents resid-
ing in different states, and even an incen-
tive of sorts for noncustodial parents to 
relocate solely to avoid a state court's 
jurisdiction, Congress enacted the Full 
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders 
Act in 1994.133 The "Full-Faith Amend-
ments" of the Act amended the Child 
Support Recovery Act to help facilitate 
interstate enforcement and to avoid "juris-
dictional competition among different 
state courts.,,134 
In order to trigger full faith and cred-
it under the Full-Faith Amendments, the 
court issuing the child-support order must 
have had appropriate subject-matter juris-
diction and personal jurisdiction over all 
parties and must have satisfied due 
process guarantees of notice and hear-
ing for all parties. 135 A court that follows 
these procedures retains "continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction" as long as the child, 
or any contestant, resides in that state.136 
The court of another state may modify 
an order issued by a different state only 
if the subsequent court has appropriate 
jurisdiction and the issuing court no 
longer maintains exclusive jurisdiction 
because either the child no longer resides 
there, or each party has filed written con-
sent to change venue. 137 In enacting the 
Full-Faith Amendments, Congress also 
sought to help custodial parents collect 
on child-support orders when noncusto-
dial parents leave the state. 138 As a result, 
a noncustodial parent who wants to file 
for a reduction in support payments must 
file in the state that originally issued the 
order; this ensures that the custodial par-
ent receives proper notice and a reason-
able opportunity to object.139 
The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act sets 
up a national system to track the place of 
employment of child-support obligors.140 
New-hire information is also sent to a 
national directory of new hires, which 
runs a computer match against a federal 
case registry of child-support orders to 
determine if delinquent parents have 
gone to work in other states. As a result, 
if an obligor parent leaves a state and 
goes to work anywhere in the country, 
that state's child-support agency should 
know in a very short time. Under the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 
that child-support agency may then send 
130 See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (985); Fondacaro 
& Stolle, supra note 129. 
131 See Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.S.D. 1995). 
132 Alaska Dep't of Revenue v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1998). 
133 Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Pub. 1. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 
(1994). 
134 § 1738B, 108 Stat. at 4064 (amending 28 U.s.c. § 1738B); see also S. REP. No. 103-361, at 
4 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259, 3260. 
135 28 U.S.c. § 1738B(c). 
136 Id. § 1738B(d). 
137 Id. § 1738B(e). 
138 See Pub. 1. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 (994). 
139 See S. REP. No. 103-361, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259, 3261. 
140 42 U.S.c. § 653. 
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a wage withholding order directly across 
state lines to the delinquent parent's 
employer.141 
Although a number of states had 
new-hire reporting statutes before pas-
sage of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 
under the Act all states were required to 
have programs conforming to the feder-
al requirements by October 1, 1998. 
Practitioners can assist clients seeking to 
initiate or enforce child-support orders 
by contacting their new-hire state con-
tacts for information on implementing 
these procedures in individual cases.142 
D. New Federal Criminal Remedies 
for Enforcement 
Practitioners attempting to collect 
arrearages from an out-of-state obligor 
should advise their clients that they have 
two important options: to file an action 
under the state's Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act or to seek 
criminal prosecution under the Child 
Support Recovery Act.143 
When it enacted the Child Support 
Recovery Act, Congress was primarily 
concerned with noncustodial parents 
who move to another state to avoid pay-
ing child support. As a result, the Act calls 
for federal criminal prosecution of any 
noncustodial parent who willfully fails to 
pay a past-due support obligation for a 
child who resides in another state. The 
crime established in the Act has been sub-
ject to constitutional challenge in many 
courts but has been consistently upheld 
as a valid exercise of congressional com-
merce power.144 Practitioners who want 
to use the Act to encourage payment of 
arrearages should refer their clients to 
their local U.S. Attorney's office. While 
most of these offices are just beginning to 
bring prosecutions under the Act, some 
larger jurisdictions have established units 
specifically to bring these cases. 
The past 25 years have seen increas-
ing federalization of child-support admin-
istration and enforcement. Although 
many states' IV-D agencies continue to 
establish and collect child support, prac-
titioners in all states should become famil-
iar with federal laws in this area. Only 
by understanding the federal programs 
and requirements that affect state man-
agement of child-support programs will 
family law practitioners be able optimal-
ly to represent and serve their clients. 
141 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 501, 9 U.L.A. 410 (Supp. 1999). 
142 For a list of new-hire state contacts, see Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs., New Hire Reporting (last updated Jan. 1999) 
<www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/newhire/nh/nh.htm> (select "How to Contact the 
States"). 
143Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 98 U.L.A. 567 (1987); Child Support 
Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (West Supp. 1996). 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Black, 125 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 479-80 
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Simms, 936 F. Supp. 817, 818 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United 
States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995). 
JULY-AUGUST 2000 I JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND POLICY 
Collecting Child Support 
181 
